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The Bologna Process Goes East?
from “Third Countries” to Prioritizing
Inter-regional Cooperation Between
the ASEAN and EU
Que Anh Dang
1 Introduction
Over the past 15 years, the Bologna Process (BP) has evolved from being a
pan-European project to a signiﬁcant regional reform of higher education which
exerts its influence beyond the borders of Europe. Initially other regions, such as
North America, observed this re-organization of Europe’s higher education struc-
ture with some scepticism (Clark 2014), but more recently, the creation of a
European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and a European Research Area
(ERA) has increased the interest across the world, especially Asia. The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea) have been observing the development of the Bologna Process
and viewing the Bologna Process, EHEA and ERA as a useful model for their
regional higher education reforms. Japan and China have participated in all three
Bologna Policy Forums since 2009. These countries also fear that the ‘attractive’
European higher education region will expand its links to ASEAN to the detriment
of their position in ASEAN and in the international marketplace (Kamibeppu
2013).
The Bologna Process has inspired the ASEAN ministers to set an ambitious plan
in 2008 with an aim to achieve greater regional harmonization involving 6500
higher education institutions and 12 million post-secondary students (ICEF 2014)—
about the same size as the EHEA. The region began a process of building
a ‘Common Space for Higher Education’ contributing to the establishment of the
ASEAN Economic Community. The European Union (EU) has been supporting
the ASEAN regional integration process and education is one of the top priorities in
the interregional EU-ASEAN dialogues. These developments raise important
questions: Through which mechanisms do the Bologna ideas and policy instru-
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ments become a model for the regionalization of ASEAN higher education? Why
does ASEAN regional higher education matter to the EHEA and vice versa? What
are the differences of the ‘ASEAN common space for higher education’ and the
EHEA?
Most regional studies on ASEAN and the EU favour the theory of policy dif-
fusion, which describes the EU-style institutions as a putative paradigm for ASEAN
regional integration (Allison 2013; Jetschke and Lenz 2013; Jetschke and Murray
2012). Some scholars in educational sociology also claim that regionalization of
higher education in Asia aspires to replicate the Bologna Process (Chao 2014a;
Vögtle and Martens 2014). These scholars tend to see Asian countries as passive
recipients of ideas and norms, and somewhat downplay the role of the agency of
local policy actors. This paper draws on both policy diffusion literature in political
science and social constructivist work in critical policy studies to posit that policies
are not merely transferred through diffusion over space or across policymaking
sites, but their form and effect are also transformed through ongoing mutation
processes (Peck 2011; Peck and Theodore 2010, 2012). The paper also highlights
the role of contexts and of the policy actors—‘localizers’ who reconstruct external
policy ideas and transform them into their local ‘cognitive priors’ (Acharya 2009).
Tracing the evolution of the ASEAN regional cooperation in higher education
over the last decade through an empirical study of ASEAN policy makers, this
paper argues that ASEAN actively constructs a nascent ‘ASEANess’ higher edu-
cation region and can potentially change the nature of engagement with the
European counterpart. From being a collection of ‘third countries’ in Brussels’
language, ASEAN becomes a strategic partner in inter-regional cooperation with
the Bologna countries that are also members of the EU.
In line with the EU’s external policies and with a growing emphasis on
“internationalization” in many European national education policy contexts, the
Bologna Process increasingly prioritizes its dialogues and negotiations with regions
over individual countries, thus expands its outreach to a larger scale. Since the
European Commission joined the Bologna Process, Bologna cooperation with other
regions seems to create a political space for the Commission to act on behalf of its
member states in higher education. The 40-year regional ties between ASEAN and
the EU also serve as a foundation for higher education, science and technology to
become a priority area of cooperation between the two regions. This point was
explicitly mentioned in the plan of action to strengthen ASEAN-EU partnership for
the period 2013–2017.1 For all these reasons, this essay will focus only on the
regional dialogues between the EU and the ASEAN+3, given the extensive
memberships of the Bologna Process.
The paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Following the introduction, the second
section lays out the regional architecture of ASEAN higher education landscape.
The third section recaps the history of the Bologna external dimension and draws
on the theoretical literature on policy diffusion, policy mobility, and constitutive
1http://eeas.europa.eu/asean/docs/plan_of_action_en.pdf (accessed on 23 December 2014).
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localisation to analyze how, by whom and to what extent the Bologna Process has
become a model of regionalization of the ASEAN higher education. The fourth
section presents the empirical cases and qualitative data collected by the author at
regional forums in order to depict the distinctive features, the emergence and
developments of regional projects in ASEAN. The last section summarizes the main
arguments and draws some concluding remarks on the possible changing nature of
EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation in higher education.
2 Regionalism and Higher Education in ASEAN
2.1 Regionalism in ASEAN
ASEAN was established in August 1967 in Bangkok by ﬁve founding members—
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in
1984, whereas Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia joined in the 1990s. There
are multiple theoretical perspectives on the ASEAN regionalism. Realists see the
establishment of ASEAN as an act of power seeking (Rüland and Jetschke 2008).
The ASEAN regional aspirations were understood by realists as a group of small,
weak states, which do not possess the economic or military resources to be a
dominant regional power, who formed themselves in a regional grouping as the
only way to increase its collective bargaining power and exercise its political
influence (Narine 1998). The principles of ‘non-interference into the internal affairs
of the members’ and ‘consensual decision-making’ remain crucial norms (Jetschke
and Murray 2012). This informal and non-binding regional institution has been
known as the ‘ASEAN way’ for over forty years which has also been, rightly or
wrongly, criticized for its ineffectiveness from a Western liberal perspective (Wong
2012).
Constructivists see regions as social, economic and political constructions based
on material transactions and a degree of interdependence (Dent 2012; Rüland
2010), with its shared norms, identities, practices and institutions facilitating
‘regioness’ (Hettne 2005). Acharya (2009, p. 21) names these factors as ‘cognitive
priors’ which determine and condition an individual or social group’s receptivity to
new norms. He also points out that the cognitive priors of nations or regions in
international relations could be built around traditional culture, historical memory,
practices of statecraft and diplomatic interaction patterns (ibid). In other words, the
colonialism and decolonialism periods, the vagaries of the Cold War and the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis in the late 1990s has profoundly influenced the ASEAN regionalism
as Stubbs (2008) argues. Seizing the opportunity of the ambiguity created by the
ending of the Cold War, ASEAN not only enlarged its membership, but also
established and institutionalized other multilateral dialogues, such as the
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) in 1997
and the East Asia Summit in 2005. In the ﬁrst instance, the ASEAN+3 cooperation
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was a reaction to the ASEAN ﬁnancial crisis and to strengthen the East Asia
Economic Caucus by keeping the United States out (Doidge 2011), then it quickly
led to a further series of dialogues between the leaders, ministers and seniors
ofﬁcials (Dent 2012; Yeo 2010). Cooperation also extended from economic and
ﬁnancial areas to many other areas, including education. Noticeably, from around
2005 when the Bologna Process increasingly exerted its influence on global higher
education beyond Europe, the agenda of ASEAN+3 has included higher education
at government level.
2.2 ASEAN Regional Higher Education
The ASEAN regional higher education architecture consists of two main institu-
tions. The ﬁrst is the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
(SEAMEO) established before ASEAN in 1965 to promote cooperation in educa-
tion, science and culture in the region. The second is the emerging or re-emerging
ASEAN framework for educational cooperation. After a long interval from the ﬁrst
ASEAN education ministers’ meeting (ASED) in 1977 which called for a com-
parative study of the education systems of member countries to set up effective
collaboration, and exchanged views on the concept of an ASEAN university
(ASED 1977), the ASEAN education ministers have resumed their meetings on a
regular basis since 2006. In the ﬁrst six years, ASED meetings were held
back-to-back with the annual SEAMEO Council conference.
The turning point was the 15th ASEAN Summit in 2009 in Thailand, which
gave new momentum to the regional education cooperation for “promoting
understanding among ASEAN people and ensuring the competitiveness of ASEAN
Community in the global market” (ASEAN 2009). The focus has shifted from
intra-regional solidarity through education to enhancing the identity of ‘ASEAN
people’ and increasing the role and power of education in the political and eco-
nomic arena. Moreover, the 5th ASED meeting in 2010 also emphasized the
necessity of ‘strengthening, deepening and widening educational cooperation
within ASEAN and outside the region” (ASED 2010), namely the ASEAN+3 under
the work plan (2010–2017) and the East Asia Summit countries, including China,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand, with the United States
and Russia joining in 2011. Since 2012, the ASEAN education ministers have
organized their own meetings biennially, separate from those of SEAMEO, and
invited the ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit education ministers to join. There was
no announced reason for this separation, but my observations support arguments
that the ASEAN identity was diluted when ASED was only a ‘side-event’ of the
SEAMEO, and the agendas and the memberships of ASED and SEAMEO became
increasingly different. Furthermore, as the ASEM education process gathered pace,
ASEAN+3 education cooperation aspires to consolidate itself to become a more
cohesive region to act effectively at the Asia-Europe interface. Last but not least, the
Plus Three countries support the ASEAN regional integration in all spheres
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including higher education, but their national interests in this endeavour are not
concealed. With their ageing populations, Japan, China and Korea are increasingly
interested in the brainpower of the ASEAN’s young talented students and scholars
for their knowledge economy missions. Therefore, while the agenda of ASED
centres mainly around the ASEAN countries’ commitment to achieving the
Millennium Development Goals, Education for All by 2015 (ASED 2014), the
discussion on higher education dominates the meetings of ASEAN+3 and it was
also fuelled with the range of initiatives and projects proposed by the countries,
such as students mobility, quality assurance, university networks, ASEAN research
clusters and citation index, rectors’ conference, and the ASEAN cyber university
(APT 2014).
The history and development of the ASEAN regional education cooperation
over 40 years and the ASEAN+3 cooperation in the last decade have consolidated
the region’s own model of integration, which is based on inter-governmental dia-
logues, voluntary commitments, regular meetings and statements. It would be
implausible to claim that the 15-year old Bologna Process is the template for
regional policy coordination, as Vogtle and Martens (2014) concluded in their
recent research. Although the substance of the Bologna action lines may be seen
resembled in the recent ASEAN regional talks, this new development occurs due to
the mutual interests from the EU seeking to diffuse the Bologna policy and from the
ASEAN looking to learn from it. Notably, the EU has shown an interest in what is
happening in ASEAN and Germany inaugurated the Asia-Europe Education
Ministers’ biennial forum on higher education in 2008. ASEAN has also
acknowledged that the Bologna Process serves as an inspiration and reference for
ASEAN’s own higher education harmonization. ASEAN ofﬁcials often indicated
that they studied the EU regional education policies in order to avoid the same
mistakes and pitfalls (Dang 2013).
3 The Bologna Process Goes East: From Policy Diffusion
to Policy Mutation
3.1 The Bologna Goes East
Three years after the Bologna Declaration was signed in 1999 by 29 European
countries, the Bologna Follow Up Group (BFUG) drafted a report on “attractive-
ness, openness and cooperation” as the three main entities of the Bologna Process
‘external dimension’, which then became a point on the agenda of the Bologna
Ministers from their Berlin meeting in 2003 onwards. In the Bologna language,
‘Attractiveness’ referred to quality, transparency, diversity and visibility,
‘Openness’ called for joint effort to make European higher education open to
students from all over the world. And ‘Cooperation’ was to promote the ‘Bologna
idea’ of regional cooperation and integration through dissemination of experiences
The Bologna Process Goes East? … 767
with other regions, although the goal was not to directly associate non-European
countries to the process (BFUG 2002). From an unintentional idea of making the
Bologna Process a model for regional reform of higher education (Zgaga 2006), the
Bologna countries became proactive in promoting the Bologna philosophy by
“opening their seminars and conferences to representatives of other regions” (Berlin
Communique 2003) and seeing “the need to identify partner regions and intensify
the exchange of ideas and experiences with those regions” (Bergen Communique
2005, emphasis added). The ‘external dimension working group’ was also set up in
2005–2006 to collect and analyze reactions and echoes of various kinds from other
parts of the world, such as ASEAN and the African Union. Regional cooperation
with the “outer world” has also created a new space for the European Commission
to act as a supranational entity. The Commission has provided ﬁnancial support to a
number of projects with ASEAN since the 2000s, such as the ASEAN-EU
University Network Programme (AUNP 2000–2006),2 the Asia-Link programme
(2002–2006), Asia Windows (2004), the EU-Asian Higher Education Platform—
EAHEP (2008–2009). These projects and the policy dialogues and networks that
they generated could be seen as vehicles to diffuse the European policies of higher
education.
3.2 Policy Diffusion
Börzel and Risse (2009, 2012) note that the EU promotes regionalism as a distinct
European idea and the EU sometimes constructs new regions to interact with. Using
examples from political science, the authors explain that in order to spread its idea
of regional integration to other regions, the EU has developed ﬁve sophisticated
diffusion mechanisms which exert direct and indirect influence (Table 1).
The ﬁrst mechanism uses coercive authority, legal or physical force to impose
ideas on the recipients who have no choice but to accept. This mechanism may only
be relevant to the internal diffusion of ideas in the Europeanization process where
members (or candidates) are obliged to comply with the EU laws and institution. By
contrast, ASEAN has its own method of integrating new members, by accepting
them as the ‘persons’ they are instead of demanding domestic structural adjustments
from them (Jetschke and Murray 2012).
The second mechanism concerns diffusion of ideas through the manipulation of
utility calculations by giving negative or positive incentives. The promoters of ideas
use this approach in order to achieve certain goals, for example gaining access to
new markets or preventing negative externalities, such as civil wars in neighbouring
countries, by providing ﬁnancial or technical assistance or sanctions. In practice,
this mechanism manifests itself in the form of ‘capacity building’, which provides
2https://globalhighered.ﬁles.wordpress.com/2010/02/aunp.pdf (last accessed on 23 December
2014).
768 Q.A. Dang
the targeted recipients with additional resources enabling them to make choices or
in the form of ‘conditionality’, which aims to manipulate the cost-beneﬁt calcula-
tions of the recipients through negative or positive incentives. For example, the EU
seriously downgraded its relations with ASEAN, suspending meetings and avoiding
high level contacts in the late 1990s due to the accession of Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia and Myanmar. This could be seen as a subtle form of negative condi-
tionality. Power asymmetry is the key factor in these direct influence mechanisms.
Hence, the less asymmetrical the power relationship between the EU and target
countries or regions is, the less effective direct influence mechanisms of diffusion in
inducing institutional change are (Börzel and Risse 2012, p. 203). For example, the
lack of membership perspective of neighbouring countries seriously curbs the
ability of the EU to manipulate their utility calculations. Since the EU has no or
little ability to force non-members into compliance with its standards and institu-
tional prescriptions, it relies more on other mechanisms, such as ‘soft’ incentives,
socialization and persuasion if it wishes to influence regional institutional change
(Jetschke and Murray 2012). In practice, the EU increasingly uses a co-funding
modality.
The third mechanism—socialization—is based on normative rationality and
works through diffusing authoritative norms and models which are aimed at dif-
ferent types of learning on the side of the recipients. Diffusion scholars portray
policy makers of other regions or third countries as rational, calculating subjects
engaged in ‘voluntaristic’ forms of policy learning through socialization. In prac-
tice, the EU often diffuses its policies in complex processes in which several
mechanisms are at work simultaneously. There are cases of coerced transfer exe-
cuted in the context of asymmetrical power relations combining socialization and
incentives in the form of ‘capacity building’ for direct export of the European
Table 1 Mechanisms of diffusion
Mechanisms Rationality of action Modalities and tools
Direct influence
1. Coercion
2. Manipulation of utility
calculations
3. Socialization
4. Persuasion
1. Legal and physical
imposition
2. Instrumental
rationality
3. Normative rationality
4. Communicative
Rationality
1. Coercive authority
2. Incentives, sanctions
3. Normative pressure,
authoritative model
4. Reason-giving
Indirect influence
5. Emulation
(a) Functional emulation
(b) Lesson-drawing
(c) Mimicry
(a) Instrumental
rationality
(b) Normative rationality
(c) Mimetic/normative
rationality
1. Comparison and competition
2. Best practice
3. Demand-driven
Source Adapted from Börzel and Risse (2009, 2012)
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Bologna model. For example, since 2011 the EU has allocated a total budget of
Euro 9 million to support the “Intra-ACP Academic Mobility Scheme”, which sets
up university consortia and facilitates student and staff mobility within Africa and in
the Caribbean and Paciﬁc regions. Similarly, in early 2014 the EU also launched a
project called “the European Union Support to Higher Education in ASEAN
Region (EU SHARE)” with a budget of Euro 9.6 million. This programme will
support ASEAN to develop regional frameworks of quality assurance, qualiﬁca-
tions framework and credit transfer. Through the incentive and professional
socialization, the EU will share its experience and expertise on the Bologna Process
and the development of the EHEA (EU SHARE 2014). These projects could be
seen as ‘funded emulation’.
The fourth mechanism is persuasion, which promotes ideas as legitimate or true
by reason-giving and logical arguments. Non-state international organizations often
play an important role in this mechanism, for example the European University
Association (EUA) and the European Network of Quality Assurance in higher
education (ENQA) are active promoters of the Bologna model in and outside
Europe. Often, the EU diffuses its ideas via socialization and persuasion in insti-
tutionalized patterns of political dialogues with third countries and other regions.
The Bologna Policy Forum, Tuning (China, Japan, Russia, Latin America, USA,
Africa) and the ASEM education forum are examples of such influential political
dialogues.
Finally, the ﬁfth mechanism is emulation, which does not require an active
promotion of ideas, but relies on the principle of competition and comparison.
The EU encourages competition among the countries and regions seeking closer
relations with the EU, because competition does not only diffuse ideas as normative
standards for political or economic behaviour, but also spreads causal beliefs, for
example by learning from best practice, actors borrow ideas (emulation) to improve
their performance in comparison to others. According to Börzel and Risse (2009,
2012), regional organizations across the globe have increasingly mimicked the EU.
In particular, the ASEAN has imitated parts of the EU institution (e.g. the com-
mittee of permanent representatives, the human rights commission were added to
the ASEAN’s institutional structure) in order to increase its international recogni-
tion and reputation (Jetschke and Murray 2012; Wong 2012). The authors also posit
that diffusion is “demand-driven by actors who seek to bolster their effectiveness
and legitimacy” (Börzel and Risse 2009, p. 9). In a similar vein, sociological
institutionalism analyzes the reproduction or imitation of organizational structures
by emphasizing the patterns of institutional isomorphism shared across different
countries, but in such case diffusion depends on the organizational ﬁelds in which
institutions operate, the role of shared beliefs, legitimacy for an organizations’
survival and cultural ties between actors (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
The major limit of the diffusion approach is that it tends to ignore the role of
agency in what it portrays as almost a passive process. It is deﬁcient in explaining
how the ASEAN policy makers ﬁlter the Bologna ideas and transform them into
their own regional context. This diffusion approach also neglects the robustness of
‘ﬁrewalls’ or political resistance along the diffusion path. These diffusion scholars
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fail to mention that there are policies that do not diffuse, even in an interdependent
world. Hence, understanding what does not diffuse should be as important as
understanding what does (Solingen 2012). With regard to outcomes of policy
diffusion, for instance ‘regional institution building’, the diffusion approach is only
attentive to the formal structure, such as the emergence of regional organizations,
but without explaining the efﬁcacy of the organizations (Jetschke and Lenz 2013). It
also focuses narrowly on the idea of policy convergence as the end result of a
diffusion process, with little attention to policy implementation, wider conse-
quences and variation in institutional outcomes at the receiving end (Dale and
Robertson 2012; Peck 2011).
3.3 Policy Mobility and Mutation
While the diffusion literature deﬁnes policy diffusion as a distinctively conspicuous
category of border-crossing practice, the occurrence of which is traced to superior
performance or success stories in exporting jurisdictions, policy mobility scholars
see the mobilization of policies as the reconstruction of power relations between
jurisdictions. That is because the very movement of policies remakes the connec-
tions between sites of policy inventors and policy recipients through (re)con-
structing policy networks and circulatory mechanisms (Peck 2011; Peck and
Theodore 2010, 2012). These authors also argue that context matters in the sense
that political landscapes are more than just empty space where diffusion takes place;
they are reconstructed through the back and forth trafﬁc of policy norms and
practices. Unlike the diffusion approach which sees policies diffuse from the cap-
itals of innovators/inventors to the hinterlands of emulators, the term ‘policy
mobility’ connotes the multiplicity of processes, in which policy regimes are
becoming more deeply and relationally interconnected through global networks of
policy actors (Peck 2011, pp. 1–3).
Peck and Theodore (2010) and Peck (2011) outline the ﬁve key features of the
policy mobility approach as follows:
• First, policy formation and transformation are seen as socially constructed
processes, as ﬁelds of power. Policy transfer is not reduced to a process for
transmitting best practices, but is about adaptive connections, deeply structured
by enduring power relations and shifting ideological alignments. Policy mobility
also entails the reconstitution of ﬁelds of power and the establishment of con-
nections between policy actors and policymaking sites (e.g. enrolment of
‘audience’ who are policy supporters and followers or emulators).
• Second, policy actors are not conceptualized as lone learners, but as embodied
members of epistemic, expert and practice communities/networks. They are
‘travelling technocrats’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’, who are not only high-level
agents of elite institutions, but also mid-level technocrats (Temenos and
McCann 2013), such as a web of governmental policy makers, regional and
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national experts, university international ofﬁcers and NGO consultants in the
Bologna Process. Their peripatetic forms of expertise are also transformed by
the journeys that they make.
• Third, mobile policies rarely travel as complete ‘packages’, they move in bits
and pieces—as selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models—
and they therefore ‘arrive’ not as replicas, but as policies already in transfor-
mation. They do not simply travel, intact, from sites of invention to sites of
emulation. Instead, through their very movement they remake connections
between these sites, evolving in form and effect through mobility (Peck and
Theodore 2012, p. 23). That means high rates of policy mobility are not leading
to some sort of policy monopoly because new forms of uneven spatial devel-
opment and new localizations are constantly being produced. Hence, there is no
expectation of global convergence in these open-ended processes.
• Fourth, the resulting dynamic in the policy making process is not one of simple
emulation and linear replication across the policymaking sites, but a more
complex process of nonlinear reproduction. Policies will therefore mutate and
morph during their journeys.
• Fifth, the spatiality of policy making is not “flattened into some inert plane or
transaction space, marked only with jurisdictional boundaries, across which
transfers occur, but in terms of a three-dimensional mosaic of increasingly
reflexive governance shaped by multi-directional forms of cross scalar and
interlocal policy mobility” (Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 170).
In sum, diffusion scholars tend to be preoccupied with accounts of rationally
selected best (or better) practices moving between jurisdictional spaces. They
neglect the fact that the policy making process involves “a series of contexts from
the production of the policy to its movement and new point of ﬁxity” (Dale and
Robertson 2012). The mobility approach asserts that these contexts are not neutral
backdrops or convenient landing places, rather they are co-constitutive social
spatial contexts able to produce “hybrid mutations of policy techniques and prac-
tices across dynamized institutional landscapes” (Peck 2011, p. 2), including scale,
territory, place, locality and the global (Cochrane and Ward 2012). One of the
methodological challenges in studying mobile policies is to follow them, to trace
their twists and localized effects. In essence, this requires an ability to trace power
through the set of relations associated with policy mobility and mutation from one
context to another.
3.4 Constitutive Localization
Wider policy networks are important to the construction of local responses, while at
the same time globalized policies are only capable of realization in particular
grounded and localized ways (Cochrane and Ward 2012). Globalized policies ﬁnd
their expression and are given their meaning in local contexts and that local
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translation then feeds back into further circulation. Acharya (2009) uses the concept
of ‘constitutive localization’ to denote processes of re-interpreting and
re-representing the external policy norms to make them congruent with existing local
beliefs and practices. The key aspect of the localization is the agency of the norm
recipients, who are not merely passive norm takers, paving the way to a wholesale
cognitive transformation. Much more often, they respond proactively to normative
challenges through framing, grafting and pruning with an aim to transform them into
‘domestic ﬁt’ (Acharya 2009; Rüland 2014a). The connections between the external
ideas/norms/policies and local circumstances are not always obvious. Framing is
about using language that names, interprets, redeﬁnes and reconstructs external ideas
in order to create linkages between existing ‘cognitive priors’ and emergent norms.
Grafting is a tactic employed to institutionalize a new norm to suit their local needs
and values. Pruning is to cut and leave out some elements of the external policy
norms, or sometimes local norms also need to be pruned. For example, assuming
regional leadership role, Indonesian stakeholders remove the supranational dimen-
sion from the European model, but they also support the formal ASEAN Charter
which challenges the non-interference norm and prunes the informal ‘ASEANWay’
(Rüland 2014b). In other words, local actors play an important role in the con-
struction of regions because they both resist and are socialized within its structures.
They interact with, and simultaneously rework social meaning of new policies
(Emerson 2014). These processes are also termed as ‘Discursive Opportunity
Structures’ (DOS) which local actors utilise to identify ideas in the larger political
context, that are believed to be ‘sensible’, ‘realistic’ and ‘legitimate’ and that
facilitate the reception of certain types of framing (Koopmans and Staham 1999;
McCammon et al. 2007, p. 731). ‘Discursive Opportunity Structures’ are different
from plain ‘Opportunities’. The concept of DOS is closely linked with social
movements and contains three key features: (1) variations in opportunity determine
variations in collective actions; (2) relevant variations in opportunity result mainly
from the interaction with political actors and institutions; (3) variations in such
opportunities are structurally shaped (Koopmans 1999). DOS can be highly stable
structures if collective actions stem from discourses long-lived and deeply rooted in
the surrounding culture, and they can be volatile structures if collective actions
derive from short-lived and new ideation. All DOS are inherently selective and
therefore it is important for local actors to identify which DOS provide fertile ground
for only a narrow range of actions, and which DOS select a wider range
(McCammon et al. 2007). Successful localizers are those able to mobilise local
sources for their action, such as structural characteristics of political system, the
behaviours of allies, adversaries, and the public; societal ‘moods’; economic
structures and developments; cultural myths and narratives.
It is also important to distinguish adaptation and localization. Adaptation tends
to generate adaptive behaviours and make local practices consistent with external
ideas. Localization, by contrast, describes a process in which external ideas are
adapted to suit local practices (Acharya 2009, p. 19). Localization is often a long
term and evolutionary process, while adaptation in international relations literature
is seen as ‘short run policy and accommodation’. Thus, adaptation may be tactical
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and to a certain extent forced on the recipients, whereas localization is voluntary
and the resulting change is likely to be more enduring. These aspects of localization
render it constitutive.
In sum, the integration of policy diffusion, polity mobility and localisation
delineates a useful theoretical framework to understand how ASEAN regional
higher education policies have been made in the EU-ASEAN interactions.
4 ASEAN Regional Harmonisation of Higher Education
From around 2008, when Europe talked much about the establishment of the
European Higher Education Area (EHEA), the phrase ‘ASEAN Common Space for
Higher Education’ started to appear in the media and ASEAN policy documents
(Sirat 2008). Perhaps the conception of an ASEAN education space is not without
precedent because already in 1971 a regional European Education Space was
conceived by a working group called the European Centre for the Development of
Education (Lawn 2003). However, the ASEAN concept of common space for
higher education has its own connotations and meanings resulted from localization
processes. Senior ofﬁcials from ASEAN countries share their personal views on
‘common space’, which is associated with an ASEAN concept of harmonization.
By contrast, harmonization is a taboo word in the Bologna Process (Garben 2010;
Zgaga 2003). So far, ASEAN higher education regionalization is not about
achieving a highly standardized higher education zone as in the Bologna Process. It
is not about making drastic changes to the national higher education systems, but
rather aiming for harmonization, which allows diverse systems to be linked at
points of junction. The underlying fact is that the ASEAN region is characterized by
great diversity of political regimes, levels of development, religions, education
traditions and gaps in quality. Kuroda (2009) described the EHEA as ‘melting pot
harmonization’ which required structural changes of domestic higher education
systems, and ASEAN higher education space is ‘mosaic harmonization’, which
requires prudent steps of collaboration to seek points of linkages. Despite the
differences that could possibly divide, there are also other factors that can unite the
members of ASEAN+3 to arrive at some sort of afﬁnity (Koh 2007, p. 9). Student
mobility is an example of such unitive factors.
Inspired by the European Union Erasmus mobility programmes, the ASEAN+3,
countries have launched CAMPUS Asia (Collective Action for Mobility Program
of University Students in Asia) and AIMS (ASEAN International Mobility for
Students). Although CAMPUS Asia is a ‘credit mobility’ programme for students
among all 13 countries in the ASEAN+3 region, it is not a ‘twin brother’ of the
Erasmus programme due to several reasons.
First, CAMPUS Asia is one part of the 5-year strategic project called
“Re-Inventing Japan”. Originating from an agreement at the China-Korea-Japan
Heads of State Summit in 2009, this idea was followed up and led by Japan with the
support from China and Korea. CAMPUS Asia was developed and launched in
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2011 by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXT). Their national aim is to extend the international reach of
Japanese universities by building connections with higher education institutions
throughout Asia, the United States and other Western countries.
Second, the Erasmus programme is about short term mobility without joint or
dual degree arrangements, whereas CAMPUS Asia focuses more on the latter.
While the conventional internationalization of universities in Japan entails
increasing number of incoming international students and outgoing Japanese stu-
dents, and providing more courses taught in English, the recent strategies have
focused more on transnational collaboration; setting up joint programmes and
research projects (Yamada 2013). In fact, CAMPUS Asia consists of two compo-
nents with different motives. The ﬁrst component, perhaps similar to Erasmus
Mundus, is to establish consortia of leading universities from Japan, China and the
Republic of Korea to implement the strategic Northeast Asia region building
through higher education ties. The name CAMPUS Asia is thus far attached more to
this triangular mobility scheme. The second component is the exchange projects
organized in a ‘hub-and-spoke’ model between Japan (being the hub) and univer-
sities in ASEAN and in China and Korea which are not covered in the above
trilateral framework. However, in practice, the focus of Re-inventing Japan was
twisted in 2012 to prioritize collaboration with ASEAN countries. This is evident in
the number of approved projects consisting of 120 ASEAN partner universities in
2012 and 45 ASEAN partner universities in 2013 exchanging students with Japan at
programme level (Re-inventing Japan 2012, 2013). In fact, the selected projects in
these two years were almost exclusively for collaboration of Japanese universities
with ASEAN universities.3 This shift of priority occurred at the same time as the
ASEAN+3 countries intensiﬁed their educational cooperation with ASEAN and
prepared for the ﬁrst ASEAN+3 Education Ministers’ meeting with the ASEAN
ministers in 2012. This also coincides with the EU Erasmus+ project which was
devised with a bigger budget, a larger scale and more aggressive ‘external
dimension’. Thus, the need to establish an ASEAN+3 region and an intra-regional
mobility scheme became more urgent in order to act as regional partner with the
EU. It also becomes clear that such regional policy contexts, policy moments and
the policy actions of Japan are constitutive elements of the circulatory systems
which facilitate the Bologna regionalism ethos to ASEAN. A senior ofﬁcial shared
his view on building an ASEAN+3 region through student mobility and estab-
lishing a higher education quality assurance centre for Asia.
We have CAMPUS Asia and AIMS programme for mobility in Southeast Asia. I think we
can connect those ﬁrst. … [we do not have the European Commission] but we have
ASEAN+3, a framework already. At the ASEAN+3 meeting on mobility in Tokyo in
September 2013 we set up a working group. The next meeting will be in Bali in October
2014. The chair is from an ASEAN country and the co-chair will be from the ‘Plus three’
3Re-Inventing Japan Project – Selection results for 2012, 2013, 2014
http://www.jsps.go.jp/j-tenkairyoku/kekka.html
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/highered/1326678.htm (accessed 15 September 2014).
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countries. And Japan is the organizer of the ﬁrst meeting, so we were setting the agenda and
making the documents. We are trying to help the working group. So we are a kind of
coordinator in this project.
(The author’s interview with Ministerial Senior Ofﬁcial, Japan, May 2014)
Both components of CAMPUS Asia are intended to facilitate incoming and
outgoing mobility across systems. Therefore, the policy tools, such as quality
assurance and recognition of qualiﬁcations across the region became an important
issue and the Bologna Process seems to have provided some solutions. However, it
would be implausible to conclude that CAMPUS Asia replicates Erasmus and
Bologna ideas by counting on the emergence of the scheme only. A closer look at the
operation and the governance of CAMPUS Asia reveals marked differences from
Erasmus. For example, while the Erasmus grants come from the common European
funds in Brussels distributed through the sending country’s Erasmus National
Agency, the scholarship for students in CAMPUS Asia is granted by the host uni-
versity with the funding from the host government. The mobility track of Erasmus is
more flexible and based on any bilateral agreements between eligible universities in
two different countries, whereas the mobility track of CAMPUS Asia is limited
within a ﬁxed consortium with varying study durations of one or more semesters
leading to an exchange certiﬁcate or a dual diploma respectively. The governance of
each consortium is similar to the model of the Erasmus Mundus joint masters’
programs, but many CAMPUS Asia consortia cover all three cycles (bachelor,
masters and doctoral). These consortia represent the participating countries’ (and
region’s) leading universities with cutting edge research in their specialized ﬁelds.
CAMPUS Asia also has many motives. Region-building (ASEAN+3), regional
competitiveness enhancement, foreign policy (peace building, especially between
Northeast Asian countries) and cultural exchanges are, thus, seen as ‘logics of
[educational] intervention’ in the words of Dale and Robertson (2012).
From a different starting point and objective, the AIMS project is a short-term
mobility scheme among ASEAN countries with the purpose of ‘cultural enrich-
ment’ and less of ‘academic advancement’. Launched in 2010 as a pilot mobility
scheme between Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, three years later AIMS has
involved around 700 students mobile among 60 universities from seven ASEAN
countries, including Japan (Sujatanond 2014). The ﬁnancial support for AIMS is
allocated to the sending universities by their ministries. Perhaps one of the ‘har-
monization effects resulted from AIMS is that Thailand and the Philippines have
changed their academic calendars to begin in August and September from 2014 in
order to be in harmony with most other ASEAN countries (Chao 2014b). However,
AIMS has been facing numerous obstacles, such as unsettled schemes for credit
transfers and recognition of study period/academic modules, staff capacity, and
readiness of universities, coordination, and funding. In some ways, it mirrors the
version of Erasmus in its very early days, more than 20 years ago. An Asian expert
shared the story about the rationale to start AIMS:
The background is that we talked much about regionalization, but nobody set the mandate.
During a retreat in 2009, the Thai, Malaysian and Indonesian High Commissions for higher
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education started to talk about what we can do together. ASEAN is about people-to-people
connectivity, therefore we started with students ﬁrst because these people are willing to
learn and willing to explore […].We should choose something that we can handle and can
really do together. […] ‘ASEAN Research Clusters and Citation Index’ is the last point
added to the regional agenda because research is difﬁcult to do”.
(The author’s interview with Asian senior expert, May 2014)
This ‘Erasmus-like’ project displays a logic of diffusion that has less to do with
the noble notion of optimal decision making, because ASEAN policy makers are
conceived of as learning agents, working within the constraints of bounded ratio-
nality and context. Sometimes, a policy maker is a social engineer seeking
knowledge instrumentally and his lesson-drawing is ultimately about whether
policies can be transferred from one place to another (Peck 2011). The costs and
capacity constraints induce policy makers to pursue the lines of least resistance,
rather than searching endlessly for ideal policy solutions. Lesson drawing in this
case also entails looking for shortcuts and acceptable compromises. Policy learning
is thus an instrumental process.
These two examples shed light on the weakness of the diffusion literature that is
primarily concerned with observed or alleged convergence, which are usually
judged on the surface similarities in policy designs and normative rationales (Peck
and Theodore 2010). In practice, the Erasmus mobility programme mutated into
very different versions in Asia. One of the reasons for this policy mutation is the
‘localization’ process in ASEAN as illustrated below.
The political practices of ASEAN governments are strongly influenced by their
‘cognitive priors’, which tell us how external norms are considered appropriate and
legitimate. This practice is reflected in the way Asian policy actors are making
connections between foreign discourses and the local ideas and values.
We don’t want to use the word ‘regionalize’ because it is like you are departing (detaching)
yourself from the rest to be a region of your own. […]
‘Harmonization’ is not about imposing on member countries, but only trying to harmonize
what already exists in such a way that there is a common area, sort of overlap, which can be
recognized by all the members. That is why the word ‘harmonization’ is preferred in our
region. It is like an orchestra, everyone uses one instrument, but together they create a piece
of music in harmony.
(The author’s interview with Asian senior expert, May 2014)
The policy networks are relational constructs, their efﬁcacy depends on local
political conditions (Peck 2011). While the EHEA is about a common set of rules
and standards for higher education, common space in ASEAN is about opening
your doors to your neighbours.
Harmonization is about creating harmony, sharing information and experience in higher
education. Student mobility is a part of a regional harmonization project. When students
move between member countries, universities have to open their doors and show that their
system is in harmony and keep pace with other countries. In order to receive international
students, we have to improve our quality and adjust our higher education to be in harmony
with the region.
(The author’s interview with Ministerial Senior Ofﬁcial, Vietnam, May 2014)
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The term ‘open door’ is literally taken from a powerful policy discourse in
Vietnam, when the country began to re-integrate in the international system after
the lift of the U.S. embargo. By using this language, the actor has tapped into the
larger system of meaning and even extended speciﬁc aspects of ideological ori-
entations (McCammon et al. 2007) to make it appear local and politically persua-
sive. The localizers also have their own way of selecting some ‘discursive
opportunities’ to frame the issue in ASEAN and prepare fertile ground for pro-
posing new norms. In essence, the policy localizers use lesson-drawing to attack the
status quo with evidence that feasible and potentially superior alternatives exist
elsewhere.
when you talk about mobility and harmonization then you need something in common.
I remember my student time in the US, there was a ‘common room’ where people can do
different activities together without annoying other friends. Everybody can go along very
well in the common room. Let’s take the example of recognition of qualiﬁcations; a
Vietnamese student graduated from a bachelor programme in Vietnam, then studied a
masters’ degree in continental Europe and a PhD degree in the UK. That raises the question
why we [ASEAN] do not/cannot do it in the region. Why don’t we [ASEAN] open our
systems to other members and help students to gain cross cultural understanding?
(The author’s interview with Asian senior expert, May 2014)
Departing from the idea of harmonization and common space, the vision for a
regional higher education has moved towards a more macro level addressing the
underlying goal of regional competitiveness. The viewpoint below indicates that,
while discursive opportunity structures are apparent in the broader context, in the
end the policy actors are agents who make decisions about how to respond to such
opportunities (McCammon et al. 2007). The expression also implies that oppor-
tunity structure is socially constructed, and that collective actors who can articulate
frames to ﬁt with this discursive structure are more likely to be politically effective.
Common space for higher education has to be some kind of common understanding, a
common platform because ASEAN has to compete with all the other regions in the world
[…]. We can deﬁne the space and make sure that the participants are able to come up with
learning skills that are appropriate for us to compete well. Common space here is more
about the mind set and a common set of objectives, something that we will pursue together.
Ten countries in ASEAN are doing the same thing so that we can excel.
(The author’s interview with Ministerial Senior Ofﬁcial, the Philippines, May 2014)
In practice, this goal of enhancing the region’s competitiveness has great
potential to shape and construct new policy landscapes in ASEAN. For example,
the novel policy idea on ASEAN Clusters and Citation Index is the ‘youngest’ item
on the regional agenda, beyond the student mobility. In 2010, Thailand proposed
pioneering ASEAN Research Clusters and explored the possibility of setting up an
“ASEAN Citation Index (ACI)”. The initial objectives are to (a) compile national
journal databases in ASEAN countries, (b) enhance the quality of research,
(c) increase ASEAN academic visibility in the region and beyond. The recent
structure was set up in an ‘ASEANess institutional model’—multilateral and
inter-governmental cooperation instead of central supranational institution. The
Thai Ministry of Education provides funding for the project and the Thai Journal
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Citation Index Centre (TCI) set up the ACI database. The database serves two
purposes: (1) selecting outstanding journals from each country based on an agreed
set of criteria and (2) enhancing cooperation between ACI and Scopus—the
worldwide database of academic journals and books (the author’s interview with
Ministerial Senior Ofﬁcial, Thailand, May 2014).
Although this initiative does not look like it has been taken from the Bologna
model, it has some traits similar to the British Research Excellence Framework
(REF), especially the ranking of academic journals. It is a ﬁrst step toward an
ASEAN common space for research and predictably, a terrain for new public
management discourse, to which ASEAN member countries subscribe. This, in
turn, will transform the policy landscape in the region because policy mobility and
mutation proceed in tandem and in on-going transformative processes (Peck and
Theodore 2010). The new forms and effects of this regional policy are to be seen.
5 An Alternative Regional Model and Inspiration
for EU-ASEAN Inter-regional Cooperation
This contribution has sought to introduce a new approach to examining the influ-
ence of the Bologna Process on a regional scale outside Europe by analyzing the
contexts, local policy actors and policy substance at the receiving end. The policy
diffusion literature provides a framework for explaining different mechanisms for
rational diffusion and best practice replication, but this approach focuses narrowly
on the action of policy exporters and the surface convergence of policy. The dis-
cussion of policy mobility provides a more convincing explanation of relational
interconnectedness between the constitutive power of policy context and agency to
mutate the policy outcomes. The Bologna policies have not travelled intact from
Europe to Asia but have been transformed through networks of actors and shifting
policy landscapes.
Although it seems that the Bologna Process provides points of reference for
ASEAN, the active construction of an ASEAN regional higher education space in
its flexible institutional design can arguably become a model in its own right and
potentially provide a useful source for reflecting on European Bologna practices.
ASEAN has long been perceived by its member states as an organization that has
been set up in a manner that was essentially different from the EU (Jetschke and
Murray 2012), and Asian regionalism (also with regard to higher education) con-
tinues to remain closely tied to the soft and non-binding “ASEAN way”. The
‘coercive’—albeit voluntaristic—character of the Bologna Process and its Open
Method of Coordination using regional standards, benchmarks and peer pressure
would have little use in making sense of ASEAN regional cooperation. Hence, it
would be implausible to assume that Bologna experience sets the criteria by which
ASEAN higher education harmonization should be measured.
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This paper has also demonstrated that increasing policy mobility needs not imply
policy convergence simply because policies will mutate in the course of their travels
from one jurisdiction to another, and the policy actors and their peripatetic forms of
expertise are likewise transformed by the journeys that they make (Peck 2011).
Hence, there is no policy monopoly because new forms of uneven spatial devel-
opment and new localizations are constantly being produced. Moreover, if
bi-regionalism in a hub-and-spokes relationship model is what the EU builds with
other regions, such as ASEAN, Africa and Latin America (Rüland 2010), this
hub-and-spokes model is dynamic because regions can change their position as a
hub. In practical terms, the CAMPUS Asia university consortia would undoubtedly
become strategic partners for the cooperation with European universities under the
new ERAMUS+ scheme in the coming years. Stated differently, other ‘external’
world regions’ endeavours may affect the future of the Bologna Process and give
impulse to the ‘internal’ consolidation of EHEA in the race for competitiveness and
attractiveness. ASEAN goals and norms have the potential to offer an alternative to
the European prevailing institutionalized model (Stubbs 2008) that in the medium
to long term could have an impact on the global governance the higher education
sector.
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